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JORISDICTION AND 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS IN LOWER COURT 
A. JURISDICTION 
This appeal was originally made pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(i), 
U.C.A.f 1953f to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah and that 
court transferred it to this court pursuant to §78-2-2(4)f U.C.A., 
1953. 
B. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury and at the conclusion of 
plaintiff's evidence the Court directed a verdict in favor of the 
defendant on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to establish a 
prima facie case of liability against defendant 
STATEMENT OF ISSDES & RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The determinative issue presented to this court is the 
sufficiency of plaintiff's evidence in the lower court 
establishing defendant's liability to the plaintiff. Plaintiff 
seeks reversal of the directed verdict in favor of the defendant 
and an order granting plaintiff a new trial. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS - STATUTES & ETC, 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules, and regulations, the interpretation of which 
is determinative of the issues in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries and property damage 
arising out of the collapse of the roof of a building owned by 
defendant on plaintiff and plaintiff's vehicle. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and his wife, on the 25th day of January, 1984, 
were in the process of moving from their apartment and to do sof 
some cartons were required to pack some of their personal 
property. Plaintiff looked in the yellow pages of the telephone 
book where he found the name of a company owned and operated by 
Doug Campbell, who sold such cartons. Plaintiff called Mr. 
Campbell and made an appointment to meet him at his Third South & 
Rio Grande Street office. When plaintiff arrived he was advised 
by Mr. Campbell that the type of cartons that plaintiff was 
seeking were located in a nearby warehouse and Mr. Campbell 
instructed the plaintiff to get in plaintiff's own car and follow 
Mr. Campbell in his car to the warehouse, and plaintiff did so. 
Upon arriving at the warehouse Mr. Campbell drove his car under 
the roof of a building into a parking stall, which to plaintiff 
had the appearance of a large carport (see plaintiff's Exhibit 1, 
Bldg If [said building being rectangular in shape, approximately 
180 ft by 50 ft, running North and South and being open on the 
East and West sides and being closed on the North and South ends]. 
See also plaintiff's Exhibit 8). Plaintiff, as previously 
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instructed by Mr. Campbell, continued to follow Mr. Campbell under 
the roof of said building, plaintiff driving his car into the 
parking stall next to that stall in which Mr. Campbell parked his 
car, which was just South and to the right of Mr. Campbell's car. 
As plaintiff pulled his car under the West eave of the roof of 
said building, the roof collapsed on plaintiff's car while 
plaintiff was still in it, totalling his car and injuring 
plaintiff. Other vehicles previously parked under the the roof of 
said building at the time it collapsed on plaintiff and his 
vehicle included a motorhome, boat, semi-trailer, and another auto 
in addition to that of Mr. Campbell. 
Mr. Campbell was a tenant of defendant, who owned the 
building that collapsed on plaintiff and his vehicle. Defendant 
was in the rental business and owned all of the commercial 
buildings located in the same complex, which covered approximately 
a city block. Said complex is located at Second North and Fourth 
West in Salt Lake City directly behind West High School. (See 
plaintiff's Ex. 1 and 8). 
The roof of the building that collapsed on plaintiff and 
his vehicle was not the building where the cartons were stored 
that Mr. Campbell intended to sell to plaintiff, nor was it the 
building Mr. Campbell leased from the defendant. The building 
leased by Mr. Campbell pursuant to Plaintiff's Exhibit 11, is 
depicted on plaintiff's Exhibit 1 as Building II. See Record, p. 
306, lines 16-25, p. 307, lines 1-5, defendant's answer to 
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plaintiff's interrogatory No 5, p. 027 of the Record, and p. 311, 
lines 11-19. 
The roof of the building that collapsed on plaintiff and 
his vehicle was a reverse camber roof. The outer eaves thereof 
were higher than the center gable, thus it drained from the outer 
eaves to the center line thereof. Two open drains were located 
along the lower part of the center line of said roof approximately 
twenty feet from each end, and both ends of the roof were closed. 
(See plaintiff's Exhibit 6) 
The building that collapsed was not leased to any 
particular tenant within said complex, and defendant retained 
exclusive ownership and control over it as admitted by defendant 
in its answer to plaintiff's complaint and plaintiff's 
interrogatories. See defendant's Answer, Record at 014, second 
defense, second paragraph, as well as defendant's answer to 
plaintiff's interro- gatories, Record at 026, second 
interrogatory. The area under the roof of said building at the 
time of the incident was being used by Mr. Campbell and other 
tenants of the defendant as a common parking area for their 
vehicles. See Record, p. 301, lines 23-25, p. 302, lines 1-24, p. 
316, lines 12-25, and p. 317, lines 1-10. 
At the time the roof of the building in question collapsed 
there was a substantial accumulation of ice, snow and water 
thereon. See Record, p. 304, lines 13-17, p. 305, lines 5-22, p. 
308, lines 17-25, p. 309, lines 104, p. 319, lines 14-25, p. 320, 
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lines l-25f p. 321f lines 1-25, p. 322, lines 1-25, p. 323, lines 
1-22, and p. 335, lines 7-20. Said accumulation having occurred 
from about the 15th day of December, 1983, through the date the 
roof of said building collapsed, to-wit January 25, 1984. The 
temperatures were generally cold for four to five weeks just prior 
to said roof collapsing, except for four or five warm intermittent 
days during said period. The temperatures warmed considerably a 
day or two before the accident and on the day the roof collapsed 
said temperatures rose to approximately 45° farenheit. There was 
also light rain and snow showers on the date the roof collapsed. 
See Record, p. 336, lines 19-25, p. 337, pp. 338, 339, 340, 341, 
and 342, lines 1-12, p. 344, lines 1-16. Plaintiff's Ex 12. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. The defendant, who was the owner and had the sole 
control of the building that collapsed on plaintiff and his 
vehicle located within the total complex owned by defendant, had a 
duty and responsibility to the plaintiff as a business patron of 
one of defendant's tenants doing business within defendant's 
complex to keep the buildings which the defendant retained control 
of within said complex safe for the plaintiff as a business patron 
of one of defendant's tenants. 
B. Plaintiff's status on defendant's property as a 
business patron of one of defendant's tenants is that of an 
invitee not a licensee as the lower court held. Irregardless of 
plaintiff's status on the property as a business patron of one of 
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defendant's tenants as an invitee or licensee, the defendant is 
required to exercise reasonable care in all circumstances toward 
the plaintiff, 
C. Defendant failed to exercise reasonable care under the 
circumstances of this case by not keeping the property within the 
business complexf owned by it and retained under defendant's 
control, in a reasonable safe condition for defendant's tenants 
and its business patrons, to-wit: the plaintiff. Defendant 
allowed a substantial amount of artificial accumulation of ice, 
snow and moisture to build up over a period of approximately six 
weeks on the roof of the building that collapsed on plaintiff and 
plaintiff's vehicle and caused plaintiff to suffer damages, 
thereby breaching the duty to plaintiff as a business patron of 
defendant's tenant. 
ARGDMENTS 
The evidence presented to the lower court by plaintiff was 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case against defendant of 
negligence, vis-a-vis liability thereby barring a directed verdict 
and raising factual issues to be presented to the jury. 
A. DEFENDANT OWED A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF AS THE OWNER 
OF THE COMMERCIAL COMPLEX WITH SOLE CONTROL TO KEEP THE COMPLEX 
REASONABLY SAFE FOR TENANTS AND THEIR BUSINESS PATRONS 
There can be no doubt that the defendant owned the 
commercial complex as well as the particular building that 
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collapsed on plaintiff and his vehicle, nor that defendant still 
owned and controlled the particular building within said complex 
that collapsed on the plaintiff and defendant had the sole 
responsibility for the care and maintenance thereof. Defendant 
admits by its answer at p. 014 of the Record, in its second 
defense at paragraph 2, that it owned the building in question. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 covers the property leased by the defendant 
to Mr. Campbell in the same complex and the testimony of Mr. 
Campbell in the Record at p. 306, lines 16-24f identifies said 
lease and defendant as the owner of the property. Defendant's 
answers to plaintiff's interrogatories No. 2 and 5 at pp. 026 and 
027 of the Record also admits that defendant still owned and 
controlled the particular building that collapsed on the plaintiff 
and that Mr. Campbell was a tenant of the defendant. The 
deposition of Patrick Bates, Record 414f pp. 3, 4f 5f 6f 7, and 8, 
lines 1-22f as well as Ex. 1 attached thereto admits that 
defendant owned all of the buildings located on the property 
within the complex, as well as the real property. 
The traditional common law rule of caveat-emptor relating 
to landlord/tenant law has, over a period of time, been modified 
so as to make a landlord liable under certain circumstances for 
injuries resulting from dangerous conditions on the leased 
premises. Said modifications in the law come by way of the 
following exceptions to the general rule of caveat-emptor. 
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1) The lessor was under the obligation to disclose to the 
lessee concealed dangerous conditions existing when possession was 
transferred of which he had knowledge, 
2) The lessor had a responsibility that continued for some 
time after the transfer of possession for conditions involving an 
unreasonable risk of harm to others outside the land. 
3) The lessor leased the land for a purpose which involved 
the public. 
4) The lessor, either by written leasef orally or by his 
actions undertook the duty to repair the leased premises after the 
same was transferred. 
5) Different parts of the leased premises were leased to 
several tenants but portions of the premises leased remained in 
the possession and control of the landlord which the tenants were 
permitted use off but did not occupy pursuant to the lease 
agreement with the landlord. The responsiiblity for the condition 
of that part of the premises that the landlord retained control of 
remained in the landlord. 
Said defendant/landlord in this case, even at common law 
under the foregoing exceptions, had an affirmative obligation to 
exercise reasonable care to inspect and repair such parts of the 
premises for the protection of the lessee and said duty extended 
to the tenants1 invitees as well as others on the land in the 
right of the tenant. Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5th Ed, §63, 
Landlord and Tenant, pp. 434, 435, 436, 437, 440 and 441. See 
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also 49 AmJur2d Landlord and Tenant §806, 810, 811. 
The obligation of the Lessor under all of the foregoing 
exceptions is one of reasonable care and the lessor is not liable 
where the condition was not discoverable by reasonable inspection 
unless it is shown to have been of such duration as to remit the 
conclusion that due care would have discovered the condition. The 
duty extends to conditions of purely natural origin such as ice 
and snow. Prosser and Keeton on Torts, supra. See also 49 
AmJur2d, supra. 
Because of the discontent with the appearance of unfairness 
in the landlord's general immunity from tort liability and with 
the artificiality and increasing complexity of the various 
exceptions to the seemingly archaic rule of non-liability on the 
part of the landlord, the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Sargent v 
Ross, N.H., 308 A2d 528 (1973) turned the rule on its head in 1973 
and imposed upon the lessor a general tort duty of reasonable 
care. See Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5th Ed., Lessor and Lessee 
§63 
The New Hampshire Court has been followed in several 
jurisdictions including Utah. In Williams v Melby, Utah, 699 P2d 
723 (1985), the Utah court at p. 726 stated that 
The common law duty of a landlord has been expanded in 
virtually every state either judicially or by statute 
beyond the narrow common law categories this 
court has charged landlords with the duty to exercise 
reasonable care toward their tenants in all circumstances. 
Landlord liability is no longer limited by the artificial 
categories developed by the common law. (Emp. added) 
-9-
See also Hall v Warren, Utah, 632 P2d 848 (1981) , and 
Stephenson v Warner, Utahf 581 P2d 567 (1978). 
The court at p.727(III) in Williams v Melby, supra, further 
said that 
Whether a defendant has breached the required standard of 
care is generally a question for the jury, to be determined 
by whether the injury which ocurred was of the type that 
fell within the zone of risk created by the defendant's 
negligent conduct. 'The care to be exercised in any 
particular case depends upon the circumstances of that case 
and on the extent of foreseeable danger involved and must 
be determined as a question of fact.* DCR, Inc. v Peak 
Alarm Co., Utah, 633 P2d 433 and Eaton v Savage, 28 Ut2d 
353, 502 P2d 624 (1972), and 
Wheeler v Jones, 19 Ut2d 392, 431 P2d 985 (1967). See 81 
Mich.L.Rev. 99,112-13. (Emp. added) 
The court further stated in said case at p.728 that the 
test is as follows: 
If a reasonable prudent person should have know, or could 
have learned by the exercise of reasonable care, that the 
design or construction of the window constituted a 
dangerous condition, the landlord could be held liable for 
not taking adequate safety precautions In 
Becker v IRM Corp, 144 Cal.App.3d 321, 192 Cal.Rptr. 570 
(1980) , that the court set aside a summary judgment because 
the case presented a factual issue as to the whether the 
landlord could have learned of the defective condition of 
the property. Similarly here the court further stated a 
trier of fact might find that the landlord should have 
known that a defective condition existed and should have 
taken precautions to avert the risk. (Emp added) 
It appears now that it is well settled in law in Utah that 
the common law that limited the duty of the landlord except in 
certain circumstances has been abandoned and Utah has adopted the 
rule that the landlords do have a duty to exercise reasonable care 
towards their tenants and said duty extends to the tenants 
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business patrons, if not to a lesser class, in all circumstances 
and that landlords1 liability is no longer limited by the 
artificial categories developed by the common law. 
B. PLAINTIFF'S STATUS WAS SUCH THAT DEFENDANT OWED 
A DUTY OF CARE TO PLAINTIFF IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES 
There can be no doubt that Mr. Campbell, the individual 
with whom the plaintiff transacted his business and who took 
plaintiff to defendant's commercial complex, was a tenant of 
defendant in said complex, nor can there be doubt that the 
intended transaction between plaintiff and defendant's tenant, if 
consummated, would have resulted in a commercial transaction which 
would ultimately benefit defendant, to-wit: simply stated the 
tenant can pay his rent to defendant if his carton business 
succeeds. 
The testimony of Mr. Campbell at p. 297, lines 14-25, p. 
298, lines 1-5, p. 315, lines 20-25, and all of pp. 316 & 317, 
line 1-6, indicates that Mr. Campbell entered into a commercial 
transaction for the benefit of both plaintiff and defendant's 
tenant, which ultimately benefited defendant, Mr. Campbell 
intended to and did sell cartons to the plaintiff and others from 
the property he leased from the defendant, and also that tenants 
other than Campbell used Building I, Exhibit 1, that collapsed, as 
a common parking area. Said testimony further indicates that 
Campbell invited plaintiff to follow him to the commercial complex 
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of defendant where their business was to be transacted and 
plaintiff did so. The testimony of plaintiff at p. 345, lines 
5-25f and p. 346 and p. 347, lines 1-10, of the Record indicate 
the transaction that plaintiff intended to enter into with 
Campbell was to be a commercial one and that Campbelly a tenant of 
defendantf directed and instructed plaintiff on how to get to his 
landlord/defendant's property. 
In Hiller v Harsh, 100 Ill.App.3d 332f 55 111.Dec. 635, 426 
NE 2d 960, the court in an action brought against the manager and 
owner of an apartment building to recover for personal injuries 
claimed to have been sustained from a fall on the rear stairs of 
the building, in applying the common law expanded it somewhat in a 
different way than the Utah courts have done and stated that 
. . . defendants owed plaintiff a duty of reasonable care 
to keep common areas such as stairway in a reasonably safe 
condition regardless of whether plaintiff was an invitee or 
a licensee of the tenants; . . . . (Emp. added) 
Thus, the plaintiff in the Hiller case did not have to rise to the 
level of an invitee in order for the landlord to owe the plaintiff 
a duty of reasonable care. 
The court stated further that the status of the injured 
person on the landlords premises is important only to the extent 
that that person is lawfully on the premises since duty of 
reasonable care imposed upon landlord applies whether injured 
person was a tenantf employee of the tenant, a business invitee of 
a tenant, or a social guest in the same category as a licensee. 
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In Hiller v Harsh, supra, the court in referring to the 
common area retained in the landlord's control stated at p. 964 
that 
The term "lawfully on the premises" was first contrued in 
Shiroma v Itano. In Shiroma the court looked to the legal 
status of the injured person in relation to the tenant and 
held that the term "lawfully" unquestionably extended the 
landlord's duty of reasonable care to business invitees, 
social invitees and licensees of the tenant. The duty to 
refrain from wilful and wanton misconduct was found 
applicable only to trespassers injured upon areas of the 
leased premises that the landlord retained control over. 
The rationale for such a construction has been stated as 
follows: 
"A lessor may be liable to an invitee or even to a 
licensee of the lessee, although neither he nor the 
lessee would be liable under the same circumstances 
to their own invitees or licensees. The privilege 
of the visitor is not based, as is that of the 
lessor's own invitee or licensee, upon the consent 
given upon the occasion of the particular visit, 
but upon the fact that he is entitled to enter by 
the right of the lessee, who is entitled under his 
lease to use the part of the land within the 
control of the lessor not only for himself, but 
also for the purpose of receiving any persons whom 
he chooses to admit." Restatement (Second) of 
Torts §360, Comment c (1965). 
At page 965 the court further stated that: 
As it is undeniable that the plaintiff was lawfully on the 
common area of the defendants' premises, her legal status 
as an invitee or social guest or licensee of the Hannahs is 
unimportant since the same duty of reasonable care is 
imposed upon the defendants to keep the care the common 
areas reasonably safe. 
In the instant case plaintiff is not compelled to rely upon 
the rationale of the Hiller case or the common law, supra, because 
his status on the premises rises to a higher level than that of 
the plaintiff in the Illinois case. 
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Prosser & Keeton on Torts, 5th Ed, at p. 412, §60, defines 
a licensee in its broadest sense as follows: 
In its broadest sense, the term "licensee" includes anyone 
who has a license, which is to say a privilege, to enter 
upon land. It has sometimes been employed to designate any 
person who comes upon the land with a privilege arising 
from the consent of the possessor, including all invitees. 
But as the word is most commonly used by the courts, it is 
limited to those who enter with that consent and nothing 
more. 
Such a person comes for his own purposes rather 
than for any purpose or interest of the possessor of the 
land 
At page 413 of the Hornbook series it states that persons 
included in the class of a licensee are: 
. . loafers, loiterers, and people who come in only to get 
out of the weather; those in search of their children, 
servants or other third persons; spectators and sightseers 
not in any way invited to come; those who enter for social 
visits or personal business dealings with employees of the 
possessor of the land; . . . . 
Under the common law without any exceptions the plaintiff 
might have been nothing more than a licensee, but with the 
exceptions developed by the conunon law relating to areas retained 
in the landlord's control and even the Illinois court, supra, 
which only required the person injured to be lawfully upon the 
land and did not make a distinction between invitee and licensee 
as to such common areas and subsequently with the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah totally abolishing all of the categories set by 
the common law, it is obvious that when the law as outlined above 
is applied to the facts of this case, the defendant owes the 
plaintiff a duty to act reasonable under the circumstances. That 
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duty includes the duty of inspection and making the premises safe 
for the plaintiff, a proposition that the lower court rejected. 
The status of the plaintiff in the instant case, even 
though he may not now be required to be under the existing law in 
the State of Utahf was that of an inviteef which are those: 
Who enter premises upon business which concerns the 
occupier, and upon his invitationf express or implied. 
The latter is under an affirmative duty to protect themf 
not only against dangers of which he knowsf but also 
against those which with reasonable care he might discover. 
He is sometimes called the business visitor 
and is placed upon a higher footing than a licensee. . . . 
. . The typical example . . . is a customer in a store . . 
. . and other businesses open to the public are included, 
as are drivers calling for or delivering goods purchased or 
sold . . . as well as a large and miscellaneous group of 
similar persons who are present in the interest of the 
occupier as well as their own. (Emp. added) 
The important points in the determination of an invitee is 1) 
invitation, 2) pecuniary profit, or at least the potential 
thereof. Prosser and Keeton on Torts, supra, p. 419, §61, 
Invitees. 
At p. 421: 
Others who have been considered to be an invitee are those 
who bring employees their lunch with the encouragement of 
the management and even possible purchasers who look at 
displays in shop windows, or who desire on the particular 
occasion only to use a toilet, or a telephone open to the 
public, or even the man who goes into a bank to change a 
five dollar bill, or into a building to ead a notice 
required by law to be posted there, all have been held to 
be invitees. 
At p. 422: 
. . .a large number of courts which hold that many 
visitors, from whose presence no shadow of pencuniary 
benefit can be found are invitees. 
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It seems that emphasis has been placed upon the invitation, 
but at p. 424, Prosser states that: 
It is in connection with invitations to enter private land, 
not held open to the public, that possible pecuniary 
benefit has its greatest importance - but only as 
justifying an expectation that the place has been prepared 
and made safe for the visit. Anyone invited to transact 
business or do work on private premises not open to the 
public normally has the assurance that the place is 
prepared for him . . • (Emp. added) 
At p. 425 of Prosser it outlines the care required as follows: 
The occupier is not an insurer of the safety of invitees, 
and his duty is only to exercise reasonable care for their 
protection, but the obligation of reasonable care is a full 
one, applicable in all respects, and extending to 
everything that threatens the invitee with an unreasonable 
risk of harm. The occupier must not only use care not to 
injure the visitor by negligent activities, and warn him of 
hidden dangers known to the occupier, but he must also act 
reasonably to inspect the premises to discover possible 
dangerous conditions of which he does not know, and take 
reasonable precautions to protect the invitee from dangers 
which are foreseeable from the arrangement or use of the 
property. (Emp. added) 
At p. 426: 
. . . . The mere existence of a defect or danger is 
generally insufficient to establish liability, unless it is 
shown to be of such a character or of such duration that 
the jury may reasonably conclude that due care would have 
discovered it. (Emp. added) 
The traditional distinctions in the duties of care owed to 
persons entering land based upon their status as a trespasser, 
licensee or invitee have been criticized for some time as being 
harsh, mechanical, unduly complex, and overly protective of 
property interests at the expense of human safety. In 1957, 
England by statute abolished the distinction between licensees and 
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invitees and imposed upon the occupier a common duty of care 
toward all persons who lawfully enter the premises. This was 
followed in the United States in 1958 by a Supreme Court decision 
refusing to engraft the traditional distinctions into the law of 
admiralty. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 
1959, 358 U.S. 625, 79 SupCt 406. 
Ten years thereafter in 1968 the Supreme Court of 
California in Rowland v Christian, 70 Cal.Rp. 97, 443 P2d 561, 
abolished the traditional duty classifications scheme for 
trespassers, licensees and invitees and replaced it with the 
ordinary negligent principals of foreseeable risk and reasonable 
care. Over the next ten or twelve years, eight other 
jurisdictions followed suit abolishing all class distinctions 
between entrance on land and another five jurisidictions discarded 
the distinction between licensees and invitees, but retained the 
traditional duty limitations toward trespassing adults. Prosser, 
supra, pp. 432, 433. 
In Jay Stevens v Salt Lake County, 25 Ut2d 168, 478 P2d 
496, the court stated at p. 171 the following: 
In considering the duty of a landlord to persons coming on 
his property it is appropriate to point out the distinction 
between what are termed invitees or business visitors as 
compared to those who are termed licensees. In order to 
qualify as the former, one who goes on the premises of 
another must do so at the invitation of the owner. This 
may be expressed or it may be implied because it is done in 
connection with the owner's business or some mutual 
business of advantage to the owner. With respect to such 
invitees the landowner has a comparatively high degree of 
care to assure their safety. A licensee is one who goes on 
the land of another without any such invitation. . . . . . 
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In the instance of licensees it is considered that the 
owner has somewhat lesser degree of duty than he has to 
invitees or business visitors. (Emp added) 
In the instant case it seems obvious that plaintiff was 
invited to the property by defendant's tenant who had, if not 
express authority, implied authority to tender the invitation. In 
a later Utah case Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P2d 438 (1979), the court 
at p. 441 still held to the doctrine based on the concept that a 
person's status on the property when injured is controlling as it 
pertains to the question of liability. Said court stated in that 
case that the duty owed by a property owner to one who is injured 
on his property depends on whether that person is an invitee or a 
licensee or a trespasser. Since the Tjas case, supra, little has 
been said by the Supreme Court of Utah about the status 
classification of the injured party. 
In Williams v Melby, supra, it appears that the court may 
have removed the status classification of the injured individual 
entirely when it said: 
This court has charged landlords with a duty to exercise 
reasonable care towards their tenants in all circumstances. 
(Emp. added) 
C. DEFENDANT BREACHED ITS DUTY OF CARE TO THE PLAINTIFF 
Plaintiff based his right to recovery on the fact that the 
defendant let snow and ice accumulate on the roof of the building 
over a period of approximately six weeks and never removed or 
attempted to remove the same. That said accumulation of snow and 
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ice during said period melted and froze thereby causing an 
artificial accumulation of icef snow and moisture on the roof 
freezing the center drains solid making it impossible for any 
moisture to drain from the roof except by filling the reverse 
camber area to such an extent that the moisture would run over the 
outer edges of said roof after sufficient snow, ice and water 
accumulated on it. Said snow, ice and water did accumulate on the 
roof of the building to such an extent that the water was, in 
fact, running over the outer eaves thereof on the date that the 
same collapsed indicating that said accumulation of moisture was 
trapped on the roof of the building and the weight thereof caused 
it to collapse. Mr. {Cellar's testimony in the Record, at p. 319, 
lines 14-25, p. 320, and especially lines 3-7 on p. 321, describes 
the status of the accumulation of the moisture on the roof quite 
accurately in answers to questions put to him as follows: 
Q. Did you have an opportunity to observe the snow on the 
building on the roof before it collapsed? 
A. You could see portions of it from my position from my 
warehouse door. You could see that the roof was full-
(Emp. added) 
At lines 11-15, p. 321, the following was solicited from the 
witness: 
Q. What did you observe if anything on that day with 
regard to the snow on the building? 
A. Well it had been dripping on the — it would be the 
northwest corner where I usually do park. 
Q. It was dripping off this corner? 
A. Uh huh. (Affirmative) 
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See also McKeller's testimony at pp« 322, 323, and 324, 
lines 1-23, and especially p. 335, lines 7-20, where the witness 
stated the following: 
Q. You indicated to counsel that you didn't see any 
reason to be concerned about the building when you 
observed it the day before, and on the day that it 
fell until you heard the noises. You had NO concern 
about the ice and snow that you talked about that was 
stacked up on top of the building? 
A. Wellr yeah, there was concern. Everybody had been 
saying, in the newspaper and everything — shovelling 
snow. But they are warehouses. 
Q. Did you have any concern about the ice on top? 
A. Not really. 
Q. You didn't think it was going to fall in? 
A. Well, I didn't park my car there. 
(Emp added) 
See also the testimony of Keith Brown, an expert weather 
consultant beginning at p. 336, line 25, and all of pp. 337, 338, 
339, 340, 341, and 342, lines 1-12, as well as plaintiff's Ex. 12 
in conjunction with Mr. Brown's testimony, all of which indicate 
the condition of the weather during the period of time from about 
the 15th of December through the 25th of January, the date of the 
accident. 
Said defendant knew, or with the exercise of reasonable 
care should have known, that such an accumulation of ice, snow and 
water on a reverse camber roof without proper drainage or with the 
center drains frozen and plugged or without defendant physically 
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removing said accumulation of moisture from the rooff that the 
same would create a substantial risk and be a hazard to tenants 
and their customers and, in factf did become such when the roof 
collapsed as it did. 
The lower court seemingly resurrected the status of 
caveat-emptor in this case when it imposed the status of a 
licensee on the plaintiff, who had no opportunity to discover the 
risk and danger involved, whenf in factf the landlord had ample 
time to discover the danger and correct the same. When one party 
has such an advantage over the other, which party should bear the 
responsibility. The answer seems obvious in the instant case, 
that the defendant should do so. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented to the lower court was sufficient to 
establish liability on the part of the defendant to submit the 
case to the jury, and the lower court erred when it failed to do 
so and granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. 
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of June, 1987. 
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DENNIS C. FERGUSON - Bar No. A1061 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD H. GREGORY, ) 
Plaintiff, ) DIRECTED VERDICT 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. C84-2377 
FOURTH WEST INVESTMENTS, LTD., ) Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
dba of ELLIS R. IVORY, a ) 
general partnership, ) 
Defendant. ) 
This action came on regularly for trial commencing 
November 18, 1986 at 10:00 A.M., before the Honorable Timothy 
R. Hanson, District Court Judge, sitting with jury, in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. Plaintiff was represented by Byron L. Stubbs, 
defendant was represented by Dennis C. Ferguson of the law firm 
of Snow, Christensen & Martineau. A jury of eight people was 
regularly empaneled and sworn to try the action. Plaintiff 
proceeded with the presentation of his evidence on November 18, 
19 and 20. 
At the close of the evidence offered by plaintiff, 
defendant moved for a directed verdict pursuant to Rule 50(a), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on the grounds that plaintiff 
had failed to establish a prima facia case of liability. 
Having heard and considered the argument of counsel 
and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, 
resolving all facts and inferences in favor of the plaintiff, 
the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to present any 
substantial evidence establishing defendant's liability and 
there is no reasonable basis in the evidence and the inferences 
to be drawn therefrom that would support judgment against 
defendant and in favor of the plaintiff except upon mere 
speculation or conjecture. Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED, DIRECTED AND ADJUDGED that judgment 
be, and the same is, hereby rendered in favor of the defendant 
and against the plaintiff, no cause of action. 
DATED this /^ day of Af& frf/risd^^9 , 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
o 
Timothy R. Hanson 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
Byron L. Stubbs 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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21 I THE COURT: Well, gentlemen, a motion for a 
22 i directed verdict, the Court must, and appropriately so, 
I 
23 i weigh every inference in favor of the Plaintiff against 
i 
! 
24 j whom the motion is served. And the Court must find after 
25 ! putting that test to it that there is such a lack of 
1 I evidence that the matter as a matter of law cannot be 
2 ! submitted to a jury for whatever reason, failure of proof, 
3 I speculation, conjecture, whatever. 
4 i It seems to me that the motion hinges on two 
different areas. One is causation,that is why the roof 
fell, and two, the question of whether or not there was 
negligence on causation. 
The evidence that we have is that there was a 
9 [ build-up of snow on the roof, and it weighed a certain 
10 | amount per square foot. Unless you really know what that 
i 
n , means in terms of stresses and force, a lay person could 
i 
12 j only conject as to what that means structurally. Maybe 13 
i I 
13 | pounds per square inch, or whatever it was, is perfectly 
14 '( safe for this roof application, or perhaps it's too much. 
I 
15 j If that was the sole basis for the motion for a directed 
16 verdict, I don't have any difficulty with it, because I 
17 i would deny the motion, not because I think there is a 
18 | plethora of evidence, but maybe there would be an inference 
19 I that the jury could rely upon, and appropriately rely upon 
i 
20 i as to causation. But there is nothing else yet suggested. 
21 j I agree with Mr. Stubbs that he does not have to 
i 
22 I rule out all possibilities for causation. He has to 
23 
24 
suggest some. Ifm not at all sure that the evidence rises 
to that level. But I have enough concern about it that I 
25 ' would not grant the motion on a directed verdict on that 
19 
1
 basis alone. 
2 The second problem gives me much greater concern. 
3
 The only evidence before this Court as to the duty of this 
4
 building owner is that there was snow on the roof. And 
5 even if I'm to assume that the jury would be entitled to 
6 infer from the fact that there was snow on the roof, that 
7 that caused the building to collapse, I canft find any 
8 negligence. There is nothing to indicate that they should 
9 have known about it. There is nothing in the records to 
10 I indicate that that much snow on the roof would lead a 
11 reasonable building owner with a flat roof of this kind to 
12 do something about it. There is no evidence that they were 
13 advised about snow buildup on the roof, or that it reached 
14 dangerous proportions. 
15 There is no evidence that they didn't make 
16 frequent—not frequent, but appropriate inspections, 
17 because I don't have any evidence as to what an appropriate 
18 inspection would be. 
19 The evidence in this case shows that at best, the 
20 Plaintiff was a licensee. I do not think that there is a 
21 duty to formally inspect for licensees. It is not a 
22 business invitee as to these Defendants so that they have 
23 an affirmative obligation to make an inspection to make the 
24 | premises safe. 
25 ] I think the case doesn't make out a prima facia 
20 
1 case on negligence, gentlemen, not even taking into account 
2 the proximate causation issue. And when I add those two 
3 together, I'm compelled to direct a verdict in this case. 
4 And I'm going to direct a verdict in favor of the Defendant 
5 and against the Plaintiff on that issue, reluctantly, 
6 I've never granted one before in the four years 
7 J I've been on the bench, because I don't like them. But I 
8 I think you've got to make out a case. Otherwise I'm 
9 I compelled, and I will follow the law as I perceive it to 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
be. If the law is more broad than I perceive it to be, the 
Supreme Court will tell me about it. But I haven't read a 
case yet that says that the mere fact that the accident 
occurred means that somebody was negligent. And if the 
rule changes, fine. But it won't change here. It will 
change at the Supreme Court. 
15 j Mr. Ferguson, I will ask you to prepare an 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25
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